A New Layer Of Security Inside The White Space

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Data Center Design
Great Lakes Case & Cabinet





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What Will Be Covered

Intro To Security

How to accomplish a secure space

Why physical security is important

What are we trying to protect

Cage

A true layer of security

Types

Where it's frequently used

Secured Enclosure

Fail safe versus secure

Points of penetration

Locking Mechanisms



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An Introduction To Security

How to accomplish a secure space

4 D's of security

Types of Penetration

Layered Security

Why physical security is important

Brian Howard and software security

Security Compliances What are we trying to protect

Data

Physical assets

Service interruption



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The 4 D's of Security











BICSI 002 12.2.2 BICSI 005 B.4.2

Types of Penetration


Penetration By Deception

Penetration By Force

Penetration By Accident







BICSI 002 12.10.2



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Why Does Software Security Receive So

Much Attention?



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in • ter • es • ting (ĭn'trĭ-stĭng) adj. 1. capable of holding one's attention. 2. arousing a feeling of interest. 3. oh God, oh God, we're all going to die.





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Anybody Know Who This Is?





Brian Howard

A contractor for the FAA, Brian Howard took down a critical piece of infrastructure in our nations air space because he felt he needed to lash out at an employer he thought was wasteful.

How did he do it? He walked through the door, opened the networking enclosures, and lit them

on fire.





Data Theft

HIPAA Physical Breaches In 2014

- Multilingual Psychotherapy Centers 12/13/2014 3,500
 Medical Record
- Visionworks 11/28/2014 47,683 Medical Records
- Visionworks 11/10/2014 75,000 Medical Records (along with credit info)
- Health Dimensions 11/2/2014 5,370 Medical Records

Totaling 131,553 Peoples PII Physically Walking Out Of The Data Center





Physical Equipment Theft

Chicago Colocation Data Center With A Single Layer Breach

The Chicago colocation facility was broken into four times within two years. Thieves cut a hole through a wall and got away with approximately \$15,000 worth of servers every time.





Service Interruption

Massive DC Downtime

Vodafone- Hundreds of thousands of UK customers lost service over an extended period of time

Knocked down a single door and had access to the whole data center



Verizon- Oceans 11 style attack

Dressed as police gaining access by telling employees there were reports of people on the roof.

Even with armed guards service was interrupted





Standards Compliance

FISMA Federal Information

- (3) Identifier Management
 The organization requires multiple
 forms of certification of individual
 identification be presented to the
 registration authority
- (2) Physical Access Authorizations
 The organization requires two forms of identification... for visitor access to the facility where the information system resides... Orgs may use PIV cards, key cards, PINs, and biometrics

PCI Financial Information

- 9.1.1 Use access control mechanisms or video cameras to monitor individual physical access to sensitive areas
- 9.1 Testing procedures: Verify the existence of physical security control for each computer room, data center, and other physical areas with systems in the cardholder data environment

HIPAA Health Information

164.301(a)(1) implement policies and procedures to limit physical access to its electronic information systems... while ensuring that properly authorized access is allowed

164.310(a)(2)(ii) Implement policies and procedures to safeguard the facility and equipment therein from unauthorized physical access, tampering, and theft



BICSI 002 12.4.2

Standards Compliance

FIPS Cryptographic Data

140-2 Section 4 Level 4 Security:

The physical security mechanisms provide a complete envelope of protection around the cryptographic module with the intent of detecting and responding to all unauthorized attempts at physical access.










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


Layered Security Model

Outside Layers











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Layered Security Model

Inside Layers








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Layered Security Model

A New Layer

90 percent of the worlds data has been created over the last two years and that data has become increasingly more valuable. With increased data, the amount of equipment to support this data is growing exponentially and the number of people needed to support this equipment is also growing

Consequently a new layer of security at the enclosure level has become necessary to appropriately manage the increasing staff and valuable data stored within the enclosures.





BICSI 002 12.2.2.2 12.10.1 12.10.2 BICSI 005 B.4.2 B.5

What Will Be Covered

A true layer of security

How to accomplish a secure space

Complete Envelope of Protection

Access Control Cage Types

A true layer of security

Types

Where it's frequently used

Secure Enclosures

Fail safe versus secure

Points of penetration

Locking Mechanisms




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Metal and Welded Wire Barriers

Metal and welded wire barriers in essence create a room within a room, developing the new layer of security inside the white space

These deployments are often modular in size, able to retrofit into existing buildings and altered to a different size or shape after initial installation





BICSI 002 12.10

IDA/MDA/Mechanical Separation

Sometimes we only need to protect our most critical pieces of infrastructure.

The IDA and HDAs, or the cores and spines of our network are often the most critical parts of the data center. They are often small in size, but touch every part of the data center. This is why it's often prudent to place these critical pieces of infrastructure behind metal or wire barriers.

The mechanical equipment, although spread throughout the data center, is often limited to few but large pieces of equipment. Due to their lack of quantity and ease of tampering it's often prudent to place mechanical equipment in a separate room or behind a metal or wire barrier to control access.





BICSI 002 14.4.5.2 14.4.6.2 7.4.6.2

Colocation Facilities

The place where you will most commonly see a metal barrier or wire fencing is within a colocation facility.

Partitioning off separate users, and often times more importantly house equipment, is often a security requirement.

Access control on each partition of the data center will allow the colocation provider to limit customers to only their own area, but also limit which employees have access to which enclosures.



BICSI 002 7.2.3.2 15.1.3



Levels Of Security & Its Basic Functions

The minimum required components for an ACS include the 4 levels.

Level 1: Central equipment processing, AKA the computer

Level 2: Controllers for field processing

Level 3: Peripheral devices, those that gather information such as card

readers

Level 4: Credentials such as cards, fobs, biometrics, pins, & passwords

Every Design should support all of the following objectives:

Permit or deny entry

Document activity and could provide automatic notifications

Alter rate of movement within certain areas

Protect occupants, materials, and information against accidental or malicious disclosure





BICSI 002 12.7.2.1 BICSI 005 8.2.1

Access Control Tiers

Methods of authentication can be broken down into three types:

- Type 1: What a person has (e.g., keys, cards)
- Type 2: What a person knows (e.g., passwords, codes, work order numbers)
- Type 3: What a person is (e.g., guard recognition, biometric data)

Access control to inner layers of security can be tiered by altering the authentication type, such as having card access to the building, but pin access to the metal barrier.

Access control can be further tiered by multi-factor authentication, where more than one type of authentication occurs at the same time such as using both a card reader and pin number to access the metal barrier.





BICSI 002 12.7.2.1 BICSI 005 8.2.1

Applying a complete layer of security


When designing a metal barrier system, if the intent is for it to act as a security barrier ensure that it is designed as a true layer of security.

Expanded metal fabric or solid metal is more resistant to cutting, won't unravel, is easy to fabricate and install, can permit environmental condition, and provides and enhanced psychological deterrence

Welded wire fabric should be used when a less demanding barrier is needed than expanded wire.

Woven wire fabric is considered a barrier, but it is used for less demanding applications, and is not generally acceptable as a security countermeasure.





BICSI 002 12.10.9



Review Metal Barriers & Welded Wire


Sometimes you just need to protect your most vital equipment

- IDAs
- HDAs
- Mechanical

Colocations often need barriers to separate customers and isolate equipment Security systems in their basic function have 4 levels

- Level 1 Central processing
- Level 2 Controllers
- Level 3 Peripheral devices
- Level 4 Credentials
- 3 Types of authentication creating tiers
- What you have
- What you know
- What you are

Create a complete layer of security





BICSI 002 12.10.9



Security Enclosure

Within areas that are designated as "high security" or similar, the following recommendations are applicable for the design and selection of ESS enclosures.

- Enclosures made from metal or similar materials of strength, durability and tamper resistance
- Welded enclosures and fitting covers not needed for maintenance access
- Tamper switches for monitoring potential points of penetration Fail Safe Versus Fail Secure Potential points of penetration Locking mechanisms Secure cabling





BICSI 002 5.5.11.1

Fail Safe vs Fail Secure

The biggest advantage to enclosure security is the comparison of fail safe versus fail secure.

Fail-secure hardware goes into a locked state, typically in a power loss scenario or emergency procedure.

Many life safety professionals won't allow this for any "livable space", but the enclosure, despite housing our most critical infrastructure, is not a livable space

Fail-Safe, and for the purpose of security this includes REX's and Latched, for life safety are more common, and in the event of an emergency are unsecured.



BICSI 002 12.7.2.2.3 BICSI 005 8 4 8

Points of Penetration: Doors

Hinges should be tamper resistant and facing the protected side of the door

The same concept should be applied for the cam, utilizing an enclosure designed around tamper resistance for the cam is important

The vast majority of enclosures have used the infamous 1333 key, millions of these keys exist, and are purchasable online at major retailers like Amazon









BICSI 002 12.7.2.3 & 12.10.6



Points of Penetration: Sides & Tops & Bottoms

All points of access of fittings like side panels should have mechanical tamper switches to monitor for forced penetration

Limiting the potential points of penetration by limiting the physical number of access points is often prudent

Tops and bottoms, since they're constantly changing for cable access should be maintained to the best of the operators ability to limit open points of access, either by reusing old cable access holes or filling access holes no longer in use





BICSI 005 5.5.11.1 & 6.1.1



Locking Mechanisms

Mechanical

Pros:

- Simple to install
- Inexpensive
- Can be a simple mechanical combination handle or hasp lock Cons:
- Not centrally managed, so require to be physically touched when turnover occurs
- Tamper monitoring
- Built in tamper resistance
- Additional monitoring of side panel





BICSI 002 12.7.2.2 BICS 005 8.5.1

Locking Mechanisms

RFID & Pin

Pros:

- Stand alone, tie into an existing security system, or integrate with a stand alone software
- Tamper sensors inside the handle
- Real time monitoring
- Capable of two factor authentication

Cons:

- Existing systems have known vulnerability with wiegand and rs232 communication protocols
- Cards can be copied, and pins can be shoulder surfed







Locking Mechanisms

Pros: Biometric

- Potential three factor authentication
- Can be accomplished with biometric cards or readers
- Can integrate into existing security systems or stand alone software suites

Cons:

- New biometric databases typically need to be created
- Fingerprints are sometimes damaged or difficult to read
- Fingerprints are left everywhere, and depending on the reader technology they may be easily copied and used











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BICSI 002 12.7.2.2 BICS 005 8.5.

Secure cabling

The communication protocol between the handle and the controller is often the most susceptible to a gecko device. Being sure to have a secure pathway from the handle to the controller to limit the number of places a gecko can be placed is pertinent to preventing MITM attacks.









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Recap Enclosures

Fail safe v fail secure

Doors as a potential point of penetration

Sides tops and bottoms as a potential point of penetration

Locking mechanism

Secure cabling









BICSI 005 5.5.11.1 & 6.1.1

Conclusion

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Thank you for your time!

QUESTIONS??

